The following is a Brochure. The below copyright applies. It is reprinted here for educational purposes only.
PUBLICATIONS ©2002 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. All rights reserved. 42 West 44th Street New York, NY 10036
Keeping Spot and Fluffy Home: Pets in NYC Housing
Fourteen years have gone by since New York City passed the Pet Law (§ 27-2009.1 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York) protecting pets and their owners. Since its passage in 1983, what is often called the Pet Law has been enforced by many courts and agencies, and dozens of legal issues have been resolved.
At the outset, pet owners should not be discouraged by clauses in their leases that often appear to prohibit pets. Various laws, including the Pet Law , override no-pet clauses in leases, rendering the no-pet clause unenforceable. And the no-pet clause itself is not always as prohibitive as it seems.
Unfortunately, people are often not aware of the laws pertaining to tenants and their companion animals, and thus give up their pets unnecessarily in certain circumstances.
Sound legal advice obtained early in the course of events is essential; if it does become necessary for the pet owner to go to court, chances of winning the case with attorneys’ fees awarded are often good. Knowing some of the laws yourself can only help. What follows is a summary of those laws.*
Question No. 1. What is the Pet Law?
In its plainest reading, the Pet Law provides that once a pet is harbored in a multiple dwelling (a building with three or more residential units) for three or more months, openly and notoriously (not hidden from the building’s owners, agents, and on-site employees), then any no-pet clause in a lease is considered waived and unenforceable.1
The law applies in New York City. Westchester County has a similar law (Westchester County Law § 695.01 et seq.). New York City Housing Authority housing will be discussed in more detail in
Question No. 14. Pet owners living in buildings with fewer than three units do have other defenses that have worked on behalf of pet owners prior to the enactment of the Pet Law. (See Question
No. 13 for more details.)
Shortly after the Pet Law was passed, it was found to be applicable to cooperative apartments.2 Most recently, an appeals court covering Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Westchester ruled that it also applies to condominiums, but the appellate court covering Manhattan and the Bronx has just ruled that the Pet Law does not apply to condominiums.3 Coops and condos will be discussed in more detail later in Question No. 8.
Question No. 2: What does it mean to keep your pet openly and notoriously?
Notorious does not mean that your pet is an outlaw. As with much legal jargon, the words “open” and “notorious” seem to have evolved together in the law. The words are generally intended to mean visible and apparent, i.e., not hidden. In interpreting the Pet Law, most judges have tried to determine simply whether or not the pet was hidden in any active way.
Thus, in Robinson v. City of New York, 579 N.Y.S. 2d 817 (Sup. 1991), the landlord argued that because Cindy Robinson’s small dog “Miss Muffy” was paper trained and did not go for regular walks, the dog was not kept openly and notoriously. The court disagreed and found that requiring that a pet be taken for daily walks was an improperly restrictive and narrow criteria for proving open and notorious and “would lead to a conclusion that all small dogs or other animals whose masters elected to treat only as house pets could not have the benefit of the law’s waiver
[referring to the Pet Law] even though they had been seen and noted by management personnel . . . such a reading is arbitrary and capricious also because it would seem to work most harshly against tenants who are house bound for onereason or another, such as age or disability, and who choose to have small dogs (or cats) as a companion without the need to walk them.”So, to keep a house-bound pet openly, you basically just have to not hide the pet. When building personnel come to your apartment for repairs or inspections, keep the pet, as well as evidence of the pet (e.g., toys and dishes), in plain sight, or where you normally keep them.
Question No. 3: In addition to keeping my pet openly for three months (i.e., not hiding my pet), am I also obliged to make certain that the owners and building agents know about him or her?
It is clear from the Pet Law that the pet must be kept openly for three or more months. Whether the owners of the building or their agents must have knowledge of this fact for three months is not
as clear. Indeed, it was found by a court in Park Holding Co. v. Tzeses that the statute was
intended to create an either/or requirement—either the building knew for three or more months or
the pet was kept openly for three or more months.4 And the legislative history supports the idea of
constructive knowledge, that is, if you keep your pet openly, the building ‘s agents should have
knowledge even if they do not. It may be useful to keep notes on when and where an agent of the
owners or management observed (or should have observed) your pet. In any case, most courts try
to determine if the building agents knew or should have known about the pet because of long-time
open and notorious harboring of that pet. The issue of who needs to know was addressed by an
appeals court in Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Rogers, N.Y.L.J., 8/13/91, p. 21, col. 2 (App.
Term 1st Dep’t). In this case it was ruled that knowledge by on -site employees was sufficient to
cause a waiver of the pet clause under the Pet Law. Thus, the actual owners of the building, or
management, do not need to know.
Question No. 4. What if my landlord threatens that he or she will sue me for legal fees and evict me if I do not “get rid” of my pet?
You should not be intimidated by such tactics. First, you may have a very good case, and if you
win, you may win legal fees. Second, even if you do not prevail in court, you can appeal and the
court will generally give you time to cure a breach of your lease (place your pet in a good home)
after the court renders a judgment. While in such an event you can lose legal fees, you will
probably not lose your apartment if you comply with the court’s order to remove your pet. To be
careful, you should contact a lawyer seasoned in this area the moment a claim arises.
Question 5. Can my landlord evict me if I timely remove my pet from my apartment after he or she sends me a notice demanding that I remove my pet within a specified period of time?
In this situation, an effort to evict you for not complying will not be successful because you fully complied with your lease obligations. You should keep in mind, however, that if you did have rights to keep your pet, you may very well have hurt them by removing your pet.
Question No. 6: Will the three-month period be extended if you enter into settlement talks with your landlord?
In one of the earlier cases under the Pet Law , it was ruled that if a landlord holds off in
commencing suit to force you to remove your pet within the three-month period because the
landlord reasonably believes that there will be a settlement, then the three-month requirement will
not be so “literally construed.”5 In other words, the three-month period may begin to run only after
settlement talks end. Therefore, settlement talks may be detrimental to your rights under the Pet
Law. It is best to consult a legal expert in this area as early as possible. Similarly, if your landlord
sends any written communication to you about your pet, you should save all such correspondence
and immediately consult an attorney.
Question No. 7. When and how must the landlord start a legal action under the Pet Law?
Under the Pet Law, a landlord must commence a suit within the three -month period to enforce the
landlord’s rights and not simply serve notice that he or she intends to bring suit. In other words, if
the landlord threatens but does not sue during the three -month period which your pet is openly
and notoriously in your apartment, the landlord cannot remove your pet. And, well before the
enactment of the Pet Law, a long line of cases clearly held that commencement of a lawsuit
means service of a summons and complaint or, in the case of a summary proceeding (such as a
landlord-tenant proceeding), the service of a notice of petition and a petition. In other words, the
landlord must serve you with a notice of petition and a petition, or a summons and complaint, and
not just inform you that he or she intends to do so. This view has been affirmed by the Appellate
Division, First Department, which ruled that the commencement of a suit is required.6 One should
be aware, however, that a higher court has also held that the dismissal of a suit on technical
grounds, such as improper service of legal papers, should not cause a waiver of a no-pet clause, if
that dismissed suit was indeed commenced within the three-month period.7
Question No. 8: Does the Pet Law apply to cooperatives and condominiums?
The Pet Law states that it applies to tenants with leases in multiple dwellings. Clearly, people who
live in cooperatives have proprietary leases. So, roughly a year after the Pet Law was enacted, the
courts held that the Pet Law indeed does apply to cooperative buildings. In Corlear Gardens
Housing Co., Inc. v. Ramos, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 577 Sup. (1984), the court stated that “all tenants,
including cooperative tenants, are in need of the protection of the Pet Law ,” 481 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
Thus, as long as the cooperative has three or more residential units, the Pet Law applies.
Condominiums present a different issue, because whereas condominiums’ by-laws and rules can
restrict pets much like a lease, there is no document entitled a “lease” between the unit owner and
the condominium board. However, an Appellate Court has held that the Pet Law applies to
condominiums, and this applies in Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and suburban counties,8 while
the Appellate Division covering the Bronx, and Manhattan came to the opposite conclusion, ruling
that the Pet Law does not apply to condominiums. Thus, for now, the application of the Pet Law to
condominium owners will depend on where you live; but it may be kept in mind that a renter in a
condominium is subject to a lease agreement (even if oral) and will, therefore, have the protection
of the Pet Law .
Question No. 9: Am I allowed to get a new pet?
You may have been able to keep your first pet in your apartment but the time may come when
your first pet is no longer with you and you realize that you want very much to have another pet, or
you wish to get an additional pet. Are you allowed by law to have one? Do the three months have
to start all over again each time you get another pet?
Courts in New York had held for more than a decade that once the no pet clause is waived or
found to be unenforceable for your pet, it could not be revived by your landlord for a subsequent
pet. Thus, the next pet had been regularly allowed, whether or not the three months had run a
second time.9 However, while this pamphlet was being prepared, a court (the Appellate Term) in
New York City has held that the waiver of the clause for your first pet will not act as a waiver to the
no-pet clause for your second pet. For people living in Manhattan and the Bronx, and until a higher
court decision is rendered, the three months would generally have to run again for any subsequent
pet.
Question No. 10: For the Pet Law to apply, must I first prove my landlord’s bad faith motive
if my pet is being used by the landlord as an excuse to evict me?
Throughout the history of the Pet Law, co-ops, condos, and landlords have consistently argued
that the Pet Law should be enforced only when there is proof that the building is retaliating against
the tenant for some reason other than a real desire to remove the tenant’s pet. However, nothing
in the statute requires such a reading. Indeed, New York already has a statute protecting tenants
from retaliatory eviction.10 But most importantly, a court in Metropolitan Life Insurance v.
Friedman11 held that proof of a retaliatory motive is not required. The court stated:
“We reject plaintiff’s argument that the statutory three-month period is inapplicable
absent the finding that a no-pet provision is being used as a pretext for a retaliatory
eviction or some other bad faith motive.”
Thus, if your landlord is retaliating against you for something you have the legal right to do (such
as make a good faith complaint to a governmental authority) that may be an additional defense
you have in an eviction proceeding, but you do not have to first prove this to win under the Pet
Law.
Question No. 11. What happens if my pet is deemed a “nuisance?”
If your pet is a nuisance, then the Pet Law may not apply. The courts have held, and the Pet Law
states, that if a pet is a nuisance, the three-month waiver will not apply. Thus, if the three-month
waiver has occurred but your pet becomes a nuisance, the landlord can bring a claim that your pet
is a nuisance after three months have passed. However, you must know that the courts have held
that an isolated incident (such as an occasional accident in the lobby) does not make your pet a
nuisance. Your pet may be deemed a nuisance for substantially interfering with your neighbor’s
use of their apartments ( e.g., frequent urination or defecation in the hallway or lobby, constant
barking, attacking other tenants, or strong, objectionable odor coming from the apartment). If many
of your neighbors come to court complaining that their lives are substantially and adversely
affected by such proclivities on the part of your pet, then the court will generally find that your pet
is indeed a nuisance.
If your pet is a nuisance, it is advisable to seek the expert help of an animal behaviorist who may
be able to cure your pet of its nuisance behavior. In such an event, and assuming your pet’s
behavior changes quickly enough, a court may find that you need not lose your home or your pet.
Questions No. 12: If I am disabled and have a companion and/or service animal, what are
my rights?
You may be protected by various laws allowing you to keep your pet. For a full description of your
rights contact an attorney knowledgeable in this area, or, for advice, you can contact: Delta
Society, 289 Perimeter Road, Renton, WA, 98057; Delta Society East Coast Office, 300 Park
Avenue, 2nd floor, New York, NY 10022; Canine Companions for Independence, Northeast
Regional Training Center, P.O. Box 205, Farmingdale, NY, 11735; Guiding Eyes for the Blind, 611
Granite Springs Road, Yorktown Heights, NY, 10598; or Canine Hearing Companions, 247 East
Forest Grove Road, Vineland, NJ, 08360.
Most people assume that a person with a hearing or seeing dog is permitted to have their service
animal with them in their home, and they are. However, those with other disabilities may also be
protected. For example, New York Civil Rights Law § 47 provides that “no person shall be denied
admittance to and/or the equal use of and enjoyment of any public facility solely because said
person is a person with a disability and is accompanied by a guide dog, hearing dog, or a service
dog.” This section of the Civil Rights Law has been held to apply to housing and includes a wide
range of physical, mental and medical impairments. The law also covers service dogs living with a
person while the dogs are in training. As just one example, the courts have held that depression, if
medically demonstrable, could be a mental impairment under the Civil Rights Law. Further, there
are federal, state and local laws giving rights to the disabled to have a pet.
For example, a federal law, The Pet Ownership in Assisted Rental Housing for the Elderly or
Handicapped Act (12 USC § 170lr -1), allows tenants in that particular type of housing to have
pets. In addition, people who need their pets because of a disability have also been allowed to
keep pets in their homes under another federal law, The Fair Housing Act (42 USC §§ 3604).
Question No. 13: What if I do not live in a building with three or more units and thus am not
protected by the Pet Law?
In situations in which the Pet Law does not apply, there is still hope. Since the laws of New York
give a landlord the right to proceed summarily, i.e., get a determination more quickly than in most
courts, this right is balanced with strict rules.12 Thus, even before the Pet Law was passed, courts
held that if a lease does not clearly tell the tenant that he or she may be evicted for owning a pet,
the tenant can not be evicted for having a pet.
Just as the lease clause must be abundantly clear, the predicate notice (i.e., the notice to cure or
terminate that is usually required before a law suit may begin) must also be clear. Here the courts
have held that the language must be unequivocal, and they have at times held that the particular
lease clause that is allegedly violated must be cited in the notice.
If rent is accepted after the termination date, but before commencement of the suit, the notice will
be considered void and the landlord must start again if he or she chooses.
As you may be aware from consumer laws, contracts in print that are too small or unclear may be
unenforceable, because they may not be allowed into evidence. Civil Practice Laws and Rules §
4544 provides that a residential lease (or other consumer contract) that has printed type less than
eight points or is unclear is not admissible in evidence. So if the no -pet provision is visibly unclear,
or the print is too small, then the landlord will not be able to place the lease in evidence to prove a
case against a person harboring a pet.
Question No. 14: What happens if I live in New York City Housing Authority housing?
Some 180,000 apartments owned and operated by the New York City Housing Authority are
exempt from the benefits of the Pet Law. However, it should be noted that people with disabilities
in New York City Housing Authority apartments may have the right to have a pet if a doctor
certifies that the pet is needed for the person’s mental or physical health. In addition, more
complicated arguments exist that could expand the rights of people in New York City Housing
Authority apartments to have pets.
If you live in New York City Housing Authority apartments, and you are given a notice to appear
before the building’s management or other agent because you have a pet, you should immediately
contact an attorney. Do not go to management alone and without getting legal advice.
Question No. 15: What may happen if I live in a building with three or more units but less
than six units?
If you live in a building with three or more units but fewer than six units you are protected by the
Pet Law, but your rights to renew your lease generally may be limited. If you live in such a building
you should contact an attorney immediately if your landlord contacts you about your pet. Do not
attempt to negotiate yourself.
IT CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED that legal advice from an expert in issues pertaining to
animals should be obtained as soon as problems arise regarding your pet and before you are
about to get a new apartment or pet. Sound legal counsel obtained early may prevent or minimize
problems, whereas negotiating with management or owners yourself could have a detrimental
effect on your case.
Footnotes
1. § 27-2009.1 of the New York City Administrative Code provides: “b. Where a tenant in a multiple
dwelling openly and notoriously for a period of three months or more following taking possession of
the unit harbors, or has harbored a household pet or pets . . . and the owner or his or her agent
has knowledge of this fact, and such owner fails within this three-month period to commence a
summary proceeding or action to enforce the lease provision prohibiting the keeping of such
household pet, such lease provision shall be deemed waived. . . .” c. It shall be unlawful for an
owner or his or her agent, by express terms or otherwise, to restrict a tenant’s rights as provided in
this section. Any such restriction shall be unenforceable and deemed void as against public
policy.” [emphasis added]
2. In Corlear Gardens Housing Co., Inc. v. Ramos, 126 Misc. 2d 416, 481 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup.
1984), the court made three basic and crucial findings. First, the Pet Law did not violate the
Urstadt law which “was not intended to place restrictions on a municipality other than with respect
to rent control regulation. . . . The Urstadt law was passed by the legislature to restrict
municipalities from enacting more stringent economic and rent controlled restrictions and in order
to encourage the construction of new housing in the City of New York . . . ” 481 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
Second, the court found that there was no reason to exclude cooperative owner-shareholders and
tenants from the Pet Law. Last, the court found that the Pet Law was retroactive because it was
remedial legislation. The court cited from another case on point called Garsen v. Nimmo, which
upheld retroactivity “in light of the law’s remedial purpose as expressed in the stated legislative
declaration—to wit that under the existence of the continued housing emergency it is necessary to
protect pet owners from retaliatory eviction and to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of
tenants who harbor pets . . . [and] to prevent potential hardship and dislocation of tenants within
this city’ (See Gordon & Gordon v. Matavan, Ltd., 108 Misc2d 349, aff’d 85 A.D. 2d 937; Tegreh
Realty Corp. v. Joyce, 88 A.D.2d 820).” And apart from the above cases, the legislative
declaration of the Pet Law states that “because household pets are kept for reasons of safety and
companionship . . . it is hereby found that the enactment of the provisions of this section is
necessary to prevent potential hardship and physical dislocation of tenants in this city.”
3. The Appellate Division, Second Department in Board of Managers v. Lamontanero, 616
N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dept 1994) held that the Pet Law is applicable to condominiums. The court
noted that while the Pet Law does not “specifically include or exclude condominiums, it is
conceded to apply to multiple dwellings that consist of rental apartments and it has been applied to
residential apartments [citations omitted].” The court went on to find that the only buildings
specifically excluded from the Pet Law were those owned and managed by the New York City
Housing Authority. The court held that “[t]hus, had it chosen to do so, the city council could easily
have broadened the exclusion or more specifically identified other structures not intended to be
covered by Article 27 (See, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book I, Statutes, §§ 74, 240; See
also, Corlear Gardens Housing Co., Inc. v. Ramos, 126 Misc.2d 416, 481 N.Y.S.2d 577). The
court concluded that “it would be pernicious to create an exception for condominiums from the
generally beneficial requirements of Article 27 of the Administrative Code [the Pet Law]. In addition
to substantive harms, an exception for condominiums could lead to anomaly such as permitting
the tenant of a condominium owner to invoke the protection of the “Pet Law,” while the
condominium owner himself could not.”
However, the Appellate Division, First Department, in the Board of Managers of the Parkchester
North Condominum v. Nicholas Quiles, held that the Pet Law is not applicable to condominums,
reasoning that, by its terms, the Pet Law only applies where there is a landlord tenant relationship
and this is not true of condominiums. The court noted that the law refers only to “covenants
contained in multiple dwelling leases and that condominums are a form of fee ownership.” The
First Department expressly stated its disagreement with the Second Department as follows: “We
disagree with the Second Department that condominiums should be deemed covered by the Pet
Law because not explicitedly excluded” (but see Board of Mgrs. v. Lamontanero).
4. 17 HCR 251 (Civ. Ct.NY), aff’d NYLJ 4/13/89, p.22 col. 6 (App Term, First Dept. 1988). The
lower court in Tzeses stated:
“Section 27-2009.1: A landlord waives the right to enforce a no-pet clause by failing to commence
suit within three months after learning of an animal’s presence. The waiver applies where landlord
lacks actual knowledge but is chargeable with such knowledge by the tenant’ conduct—e.g.,
frequent goings and comings in view of building employees. [Note: the statute speaks of the
tenant’s harboring the pet “openly and notoriously . . . and the owner or its agent hav[ing]
knowledge of this fact” [author’s emphasis, but the necessary inter-pretation of “and” in this
instance is as the disjunctive “or.”]
See McKinney’s Statutes, Secs. 143, 144, 145 and 341 ; also see Bowne Overseas Corp. v.
Paries, Queens Civil Court, L&T 17956/85 (not reported). Thus, the defense is established even if
tenant proves only constructive notice.”
5. In Park Holding v. Lavigne, 498 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1985) the Appellate Term held that a belief that
the matter was about to be settled allowed the landlord to refrain from instituting court
proceedings. However, the court did find and held that the service of the notice to cure and notice
to terminate had to come within the three month period under these circumstances. It should also
be noted that nothing in this decision should be construed to simply allow service of a notice to
cure and terminate within the three month period because the Appellate Term, in later decisions of
Park Holding Co. v. Tzeses, supra and Arwin 74th Street Co. v. Rekant, supra, held that an action
or proceeding is “commenced” (for purposes of the Pet Law) by service of process of the actual
lawsuit which must be done within three months absent Lavigne circumstances.
6. In Arwin 74th Street Co. v. Rekant, NYLJ 12/19/88 p.23, col.4 (App. Term 1st Dept.) aff’d 151
A.D.2d 1056 (1st Dept. 1989) the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Appellate
Term’s holding that the failure to commence a suit, as opposed to merely serving predicate
notices, will cause a waiver of any no pet provision to occur under the Pet Law .
7. See, Baumrind v. Fidelman, 584 NYS2d 545, 183 A.D.2d 635 (1st Dept. 1992). It is interesting
to note that the Baumrind court cited Brown v. Johnson, supra, with apparent approval for the
proposition that “the right to enforce the no pet clause is waived for a ‘failure to bring a
proceeding.'” Also Justice Kupferman dissented and would have reversed for the reasons stated in
the lower court ruling of Judge Mark H. Spires (who wrote the McCullum v. Brotman decision) and
would have thereby held that the failure to properly serve the lawsuit within the three months
causes a waiver under the Pet Law .
However, the Appellate Division, First Department, in the Board of Managers of the Parkchester
North Condominum v. Nicholas Quiles, held that the Pet Law is not applicable to condominums,
reasoning that, by its terms, the Pet Law only applies where there is a landlord-tenant relationship
and this is not true of condominiums. The court noted that the law refers only to “covenants
contained in multiple dwelling leases and that condominums are a form of fee ownership.” The
First Department expressly stated its disagreement with the Second Department as follows: “We
disagree with the Second Department that condominiums should be deemed covered by the Pet
Law because not explicitedly excluded” (but see Board of Mgrs. v. Lamontanero).
8. In Board of Managers v. Lamontanero, supra, the Appellate Division stated:
“The legal status of the occupant of a multiple dwelling unit (i.e., whether he pays rent, owns
cooperative shares, or is the owner in fee simple of a condominium unit) is not relevant to the
purposes of the statute, which include preventing abuses in the enforcement of covenants
prohibiting the harboring of household pets and preventing the retaliatory eviction of pet owners for
reasons unrelated to the creation of nuisance.
“We conclude that it would be pernicious to create an exception for condominiums from the
generally beneficial requirements of Article 27 of the Administrative Code [the Pet Law]. In addition
to substantive harms, an exception for condominiums could lead to anomalies such as permitting
the tenant of a condominium owner to invoke the protection of the ‘Pet Law ,’ while the
condominium owner himself could not.”
9. Park Holding Co. v. Eimecke, Index No. 570567/95, decided April 12, 1996. There are several
lower court cases to the contrary. For example, in Brown v. Johnson, 527 N.Y.S.2d 679 (NY City
Civ. Ct. 1988) the court held that “it appears that the only reasonable reading of the statute is that
failure to bring a proceeding constitutes a waiver of the clause in the future. The Section refers to
a tenant who harbors or has harbored a household pet or pets. The inclusion of the past tense can
only mean the reference to situations such as the one at bar.” 527 N.Y.S.2d at 680. And similarly
in McCullum v. Brotman, N.Y.L.J. 5/11/88, p.14, col. 4, the court held that once there is a waiver
with the first pet, such waiver “is the relinquishment of a legal right. The courts have held that once
a right has been waived, it cannot be revived to the detriment of a party who has relied on a
waiver.” And the lower court in Park Holding Co. v. Eimecke, NYLJ 7/24/95 p.32, col.3 held that
once the waiver occurs, the no pet clause is waived not only for the current, but also for future
pets. Finally, the Appellate Division, Second Department ruled in Megalopolis v. Buvron, 110
A.D.2d 232, 494 N.Y.S.2d 14, that once the three months passed, and no suit was commenced,
then the “lease provision shall be deemed waived.” This appears to stand for the proposition that
once the waiver has occurred, it is not to be taken away.
10. See Real Property Law § 223-b, which prohibits landlords from commencing a suit to recover
an apartment when they are retaliating against a good faith complaint by a tenant to a
governmental authority, or for other actions taken in good faith to secure certain rights of a tenant.
If this section is violated by the landlord, then a suit could not be maintained even if the three
months had not expired.
11. Metropolitan life Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 613 N.Y.S.2d 8, 205 A.D.2d 303 (1st. Dept.
1994).
12. The Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, Article 7, sets forth the right for the landlord
to maintain a summary proceeding and CPLR Article 4 is also on point.
Keeping Spot and Fluffy Home: Pets in NYC Housing
Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals
©2002 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. All rights reserved.
42 West 44th Street New York, NY 10036
Gilda I. Mariani, Chair
Dori A. Lewis, Secretary
Neil Abramson, Nancy Ashley,Victoria Brademann,Frances B. Carlisle,Kevan Cleary,Marjorie Cramer,Todd Davis,Patricia Doyle,David M. Fish, Rober Friedlander,Michael L. Galeno,Anastasia C. Gargas,Caryn Glasser,Diane Gover,Donald Graham,Jane Hoffman•,Tamara Loomis,Christine MacMurray •,Marie Mar,Laura Melissa Mattera,John McKew,Nancy Milburn,William S. Strauss,Mariann Sullivan,Darryl M. Vernon•,Lisa B. Weisberg,David Wolfson,Susan J. Zach
* Member of Subcommittee on Companion Animals Issues
This brochure was printed with the generous support of the American Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals and with additional assistance from the Humane Society of New York.
To obtain additional copies of this brochure, please write to: Association of the Bar, attn. “Keeping Spot and Fluffy Home,” 42 West 44th Street, New York, NY 10036. Please include a selfaddressed, stamped envelope.
* This brochure is not offered as legal advice and should not be relied upon for particular matters without the independent advice of counsel qualified in these issues. For counsel you can contact the Legal Referral Service of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers’ Association or your local bar association or humane organization.
©2002 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. All rights reserved. 42 West 44th Street New York, NY 10036